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Braun v. Soldier of Fortune Magazine,
Inc.: Advertisement for Hit Man Brings
Four Million Dollar Hit to Publisher
I. INTRODUCTION
In Braun v. Soldier of Fortune Magazine, Inc.,' the Eleventh Circuit
affirmed a district court's holding that the First Amendment does not insulate a magazine publisher from liability for publishing a commercial advertisement that presents a substantial danger of harm to the public.2 In
adopting this affirmative duty to examine an advertisement's language,
the court imposed tort liability on Soldier of Fortune Magazine ("SOF")
8
for the criminal acts of its advertiser, a third party not joined in the suit.
This decision strikes the correct balance between preserving the free flow
of commercial information through advertisement with the need to prevent publication of those advertisements that subject the public to deadly
harm.
II.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

For ten consecutive months, SOF ran the following personal advertisement for Michael Savage:
"GUN FOR HIRE: 37 year old professional mercenary desires jobs. Vietnam Veteran. Discrete [sic] and very private. Body guard, courier, and
other special skills. All jobs considered." 4
Savage received thirty to forty phone calls per week during the ten month
period. Only one call generated noncriminal employment.5
Using the advertisement, Bruce Gastwirth hired Savage to murder his
business partner, Richard Braun. Accompanied by two others, Savage
killed Braun in the driveway of Braun's suburban Atlanta home. Braun's
1. 968 F.2d 1110 (11th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1028 (1993).
2. 968 F.2d at 1119. The First Amendment of the United States Constitution states that
no law shall abridge the freedom of speech or the press. U.S. CONST. amend. 1.
3. 968 F.2d at 1121.
4. Id. at 1112, The advertisement also included two telephone numbers and an address.
5. Id.
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sixteen year old son, Michael, witnessed the execution and sustained injuries from the gunfire himself.
Michael Braun and his brother sued to recover damages for the death
of their father, and Michael alone sued for his personal injuries. Plaintiffs
alleged that SOF negligently published a personal advertisement that
solicited criminal activity, therefore subjecting the public to an unreasonable risk of harm. Plaintiffs submitted evidence of magazine articles and
service advertiselaw enforcement investigations linking SOF personal
7
ments to criminal convictions, including murder.
Under Georgia tort law,$ courts recognize a legal duty not to subject
others to an unreasonable risk of harm.' In applying this duty to publishers, the district court found that they must refrain from publishing advertisements that subject the public to a clearly identifiable and unreasonable risk of criminal activity.10 The court informed the jury that the First
Amendment protects advertisers from this duty unless the advertisement's language, on its face, creates a "clear and present danger."" The
jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiffs on all claims.1"
The appellate court addressed two issues of law in reviewing the district court's opinion. First, it addressed whether SOF had a duty to plainwhether the First Amendment prohibits
tiffs under state law, and second,
1
the imposition of such a duty. 3
III.
A.

THE COURT'S OPINION

Majority Opinion

The threshold question of law was whether a publisher owes a legal
duty to the public for advertisements it chooses to print." To impose a
duty on publishers to refrain from printing certain advertisements, the
advertisement must subject the public to an "unreasonable risk of
harm." 5 SOF argued that the risk of harm rises to unreasonableness only
6.

Id.

7. Id. at 1112-13.
8. Id. at 1114. The district court, sitting in Alabama and having jurisdiction based on
diversity of citizenship, applied Alabama conflict of laws. See Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec.
Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 494 (1941). Under Alabama law, the substantive law where the injury occurred controls. Bodnar v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 392 So. 2d 1161, 1162 (Ala. 1980).
9. 968 F.2d at 1114 (citing Bradley Ctr., Inc. v. Wessner, 250 Ga. 199, 200, 296 S.E.2d
693, 695 (1982)).
10. Id.
11. Id. at 1113.
12. Id. at 1114.
13. Id. at 1114, 1116.
14. Id. at 1114.
15. Id.
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if the advertisement explicitly solicits criminal activity." The Eleventh
Circuit rejected this argument as inconsistent with Georgia law. 1' In
Georgia, the reasonableness of an activity depends upon the risk-utility
analysis formulated in United States v. Carroll Towing Co. s Liability
turns on whether the burden of taking precautions is greater than the
product of the probability of harm and the gravity of the injury.1 ' Simply
stated, if the risk outweighs the utility of the activity, the activity is
unreasonable.2 0
In applying the risk-utility balancing test, the court weighed the competing interests of compensating injured victims of tortious conduct
against providing First Amendment protection to advertisers who seek to
promote their goods and services. 2 1 The court found liability to exist
"only if the advertisement on its face contain[s] a 'clearly identifiable unreasonable risk' of harm to the public. '22 The court determined that the
burden on SOF to examine advertisements was not too great because it
imposed liability only for advertisements with a clearly identifiable risk of
harm and not for those with ambiguous messages or messages requiring
interpretation.' Thus,. as a matter of law, publishers have a duty to exrefrain from publishing those
amine the face of advertisements and 2to
4
with clear risks of criminal solicitation.
After deciding that a duty exists, the court addressed whether the First
Amendment bars the imposition of liability on publishers of commercial
advertisements.2 The Supreme Court has determined that commercial
advertisements deserve First Amendment protection.2 Advertising is afforded this protection because it disseminates information about the supply of goods in the marketplace that consumers need to make intelligent
economic decisions.27 If liability under a criminal statute is unconstitutional, liability under a state's tort law is likewise unconstitutional. 8
16. Id. at 1115.

17. Id.
18. 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947).
19. 968 F.2d at 1115 (citing 159 F.2d at 173).
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 1116.
23. Id. at 1115-16.
24. Id. at 1116.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 1117; Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976); Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations,
413 U.S. 376, 388 (1873).
27. 968 F.2d at 1117; 425 U.S. at 765.
28. 968 F.2d at 1116 n.5 (citing New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 277 (1964)).
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show sensitivTherefore, in imposing a negligence standard, a state must
2
ity to the First Amendment's protection of expression.
"[I]f state tort law places too heavy a burden on publishers with respect to the advertisements they print, the fear of liability might impermissibly impose a form of self-censorship on publishers." ' The court
noted that this case represents a higher risk of chilling freedom of speech
than normal commercial speech cases because it deals with liability of the
L The publisher only
publisher rather than the actual advertiser itself 31
provided a forum for the advertiser and therefore had less economic interest in advancing the product or service. 2 Imposing liability on publishers could result in depriving commercial8 3speech "of a legitimate and recognized avenue of access to the public."
The Eleventh Circuit determined that the district court showed proper
sensitivity to the chilling effect publisher liability can have on First
Amendment speech by imposing a "modified" negligence standard.34 This
negligence standard, labeled "modified," required the jury to find SOF
liable only if a prudent publisher would interpret the face of the advertisement as containing an identifiable -risk that criminal activity was being sought.3 In determining whether this standard satisfies the limitations of the First Amendment, the court relied on the law of defamation
for publishers of noncommercial speech."
In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,3 1 the Supreme Court considered
whether a publisher could be liable in tort for a defamatory statement.3
The court determined that a state could impose liability based on negligence only if the duty was modified not to require an investigation by the
publisher of each advertisement it printed.39 Therefore, the court recarry an obvious risk of harm before liability
quired that the message
0
could be imposed.4
29. Id. at 1118.
30. Id. at 1117 (citing Michael I. Meyerson, This Gun for Hire: Dancing in the Dark of
the First Amendment, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 267, 270 (1990)).
31. Id.
32. Id. at 1117-18. See Lisa F. Firenze, Publishers' Liability for Commercial Advertisements: Testing the Limits of the First Amendment, 23 COL. J.L. & Soc. PRoBs. 137, 167
(1990).
33. 968 F.2d at 1117 (quoting Manual Enterprises, Inc. v. Day, 370 U.S. 478, 493 (1962)).
34. Id. at 1118.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
38. Id. at 325.
39. Id. at 34T
40. Id. at 348.
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By analogy, the Eleventh Circuit adopted the same requirement in the
context of a commercial advertisement. It upheld the jury's finding of liability against SOF because the face of the advertisement itself presented
an obvious risk of danger to the public.4 ' The court recognized the absence of a duty to investigate the advertisements as the key element in
satisfying the First Amendment." Therefore, the district court's modified
negligence theory, and its articulation to the jury that the facial content
of the advertisement must pose a clear risk of criminal activity, satisfied
the First Amendment prohibitions on a state's regulation of commercial
speech. 8
Since the case involved a First Amendment challenge, the Eleventh
Circuit conducted an independent review of the record as required by
First Amendment jurisprudence." The court read the advertisement and
determined that "Gun for Hire," "professional mercenary," "very private," and "other special skills" clearly implied that Savage was soliciting
illegal jobs. 4 The court concluded that the jury correctly found that SOF
had a legal duty to refrain from publishing the advertisement. 46 Furthermore, the court upheld the jury's decision that the publication was the
proximate cause of Braun's injuries because the third party's illegal conduct was reasonably foreseeable when SOF published the advertisement.47 Thus, the court affirmed the judgment in favor of the Braun
brothers."8
B. Judge Eschbach's Dissent
In dissent, Senior Circuit Judge Eschbach determined that the words of
the advertisement were ambiguous rather than obviously seeking illegal
jobs.' 9 Judge Eschbach also expressed concern over the ambiguity of the
district court's jury instructions.6 0 For these reasons, he declined to uphold third party liability against SOF."
41. Braun, 968 F.2d at 1119 (citing Gertz, 418 U.S. at 348).
42. Id.
43. Id. at 1120.
44. Id. The Supreme Court requires that appellate courts independently review the record to ensure that the trial court has not overly intruded into one's freedom of expression.
See Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 499 (1984).
45. 968 F.2d at 1121.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 1121-22.
48. Id. at 1122.
49. Id.
50, Id.
51. Id.
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ANALYSIS

In Braun the Eleventh Circuit answered the question the Fifth Circuit
was able to circumvent in Eimann v. Soldier of FortuneMagazine, Inc.,"'
a similar case against SOF: Can this duty survive a First Amendment
commercial speech challenge?
The Fifth Circuit avoided the constitutional issue because it failed to
find a duty of publishers to recognize potentially dangerous advertisements under Texas law. ss Specifically, the Fifth Circuit found the burden
side of the Carroll Towing equation" too heavy because it would require
publishers to interpret advertisements based on their context.65 The Fifth
Circuit viewed a duty to scrutinize potentially dangerous advertisements
as more burdensome than a duty to investigate them, which other cases
have held is not required."s Therefore, the court held, as a matter of law,
that publishers had no duty reasonably to recognize potentially harmful
advertisements."
In Braun the Eleventh Circuit distinguished Eimann based on the respective jury instructions." In Eimann the district court failed to require
a clear and unambiguous risk of harm." The Eleventh Circuit interpreted
the Eimann court's instructions to require rejection of all ambiguous advertisements rather than only those clearly dangerous.60 The court further distinguished the two cases by the words of the advertisements
themselves. 1 The court classified the Eimann advertisement as "ambiguous in its message" but classified the Braun advertisement as conveying a
clear offer to commit crimes.6 2
52. 880 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1024 (1990). In this case, a victim's son and mother brought a wrongful death claim under Texas law for the victim's assassination. SOF's advertisement read:
EX-MARINES-67-69 'Nam Vets, Ex-DI, weapons specialist-jungle warfare, pilot, M.E., high risk assignments, U.S. or overseas.
The Fifth Circuit overturned a $9,400,000 judgment for plaintiffs. The court ruled that SOF
had no duty to scrutinize an ambiguously worded advertisement that did not expressly solicit illegal activity.
53. 880 F.2d at 838.
54. See supra notes 18-20.
55. 880 F.2d at 835-36.
56. Id. at 837 (citing Pittman v. Dow Jones & Co., 662 F. Supp. 921, 923 (E.D. La.
1987)).
57. Id. at 837-38.
58. 968 F.2d at 1115-16.
59. Id. at 1116.

60. Id.
61.
62.

Id. at 1116 n.3.
Id.
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Despite the distinctions between the jury instructions and the advertisements in the two cases, the decisions of the Eleventh Circuit and the
Fifth Circuit are not easily reconciled. The'decision in Braun requires at
least a duty to examine an advertisement's language to determine if it
exposes the public to an unreasonable risk of harm. In contrast, the court
in Eimann refused to impose any duty of recognition or scrutiny by publishers. In effect, that court allows publishers to enjoy nearly unconditional immunity from civil liability. The court in Eimann stated that permitting tort exposure of publishers in this situation would invite "liability
in an indeterminate amount" that would ultimately cause consumers to
absorb the costs, or publications to stop circulation."
The court in Eimann determined this without ever addressing the First
Amendment issue. To the contrary, the Eleventh Circuit considered all
these factors, along with the First Amendment freedom of speech issue,
and still imposed a legal duty. The court determined that this limited
liability would have only a minimum impact on a publisher's ability to
publish commercial and noncommercial speech."
This apparent split between two circuits on cases so factually similar
presents a First Amendment issue ripe for resolution by the Supreme
Court. However, the Court' has denied SOF's writ of certiorari in Braun.0
The Court has let stand SOF's liability for providing a forum that
brought together a contract killer and his client.
While publishers are merely conduits for advertisers and their audience, they do not deserve absolute constitutional immunity from
messages they print. They must comply with a minimum standard of care
like publishers of defamatory material. When an advertisement has an
obvious motive to invite lawless activity that subjects the public to a risk
of bodily harm, society has little interest in protecting such speech. Like
the advertiser itself, the publisher should be discouraged from promoting
dangerous or violent conduct. SOF has a historical and an evidentiary
link to criminal activity and must be held accountable for future violence
when the solicitation is obvious."
Imposing a modified duty that requires publishers like SOF to reasonably recognize dangerous advertisements is not constitutionally burdensome. This standard requires no investigation of the advertiser behind
the advertisement nor does it require an analysis of the ad's message in
light of 'its context. The standard simply requires an inspection of the
advertisement's face, a standard far below strict liability.
63.
64.
65.
66.

880
968
113
See

F.2d at 837 (quoting Yuhas v. Mudge, 322 A.2d 824, 825 (App. Div. 1974)).
F.2d at 1119.
S. Ct. 1028 (1993).
supra note 7.
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CONCLUSION

The modified negligence standard imposed by the Eleventh Circuit
properly balances a tort victim's right to redress against the constitutional need to disseminate commercial information. Liability conditioned
on a clear and apparent danger of harm allows the First Amendment to
continue protecting the free flow of ideas while driving out irresponsible
or negligent agents of the press.
MAE CHARLES BABB

